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ABSTRACT
The following study examines the future of democratization and the apparent trend
towards autocratization within the context of democratic backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Initially, the findings indicate that regionally, backsliding is not acting fundamentally different in
Sub-Saharan Africa when compared to other regions. The analysis finds that regime duration and
civil conflict are both significant when it comes to the study of democratic backsliding. The
variable for the prior military regime’s is extremely significant in all of the models and is,
therefore, a strong indicator of backsliding in Africa. The chief takeaway from the study is in the
variable for economic growth and finds that as economic growth increases the likelihood of
backsliding decreases. This variable is negative and significant for all of the models, but if Africa
is taken out of the analysis the trend ultimately disappears, which indicates that Africa is
potentially driving this trend of economic growth and backsliding.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The ‘Democratic Recession’ that Larry Diamond (2015) and others have cited refers to
the trend that indicates declining global democracy and increasing autocratization (Lührmann et
al, 2018). While scholars enthusiastically pointed to the ‘wave of democracy’ that began in 1974
with Portugal, it seems that this ‘wave’ stagnated in 2006, and has since reversed (Diamond,
2015; Lührmann et al, 2018). With that being said, Lührmann and colleagues examined global
trends in democracy using the Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-Dem) and found a steady
decline in democracy throughout Western Europe, North America, Latin America, the
Caribbean, and Eastern Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa was largely resistant to this autocratization
trend, and the authors found that there was a slight increase in levels of democracy by population
in the African region as compared to other regions (Lührmann et al, 2018). This finding seems to
go against the existing literature on factors that catalyze democratic backsliding and based on
this literature we would expect to see significantly more backsliding in Africa in comparison to
other regions.
While the literature on ‘democratic backsliding’ is copious, according to Waldner and
Lust (2018) there is an important conceptual challenge among the literature in defining what
exactly constitutes backsliding. Inevitably, as the definition of the term changes, so do the
parameters and scope of each paper. Some authors find that the term refers to “fine-grained
degrees of change and incremental within-regime change”, in which the author carefully
observes the increase or decrease in the quality of democracy in a specific region or state
(Waldner and Lust, 2018). Alternatively, others have measured democratic backsliding as a
categorical change from one measure to another. A study by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014),
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uses a dichotomous measure to determine whether a regime is a democracy or an autocracy, and
measures democratic backsliding under such conditions. The latter approach fits most
appropriately with the purpose and scope of this paper, as rather than looking at incremental
changes within a regime, the theory aims to examine overall large-scale changes in governance.
Therefore, rather than looking at the nuanced differences, or a decline in democratic institution
this study examines the overall regime change from a democracy to an authoritarian regime.
The study of backsliding, a term henceforth used interchangeably with autocratization
and reversal, yields several causal explanations. While some authors point to economic
indicators as the primary causal factor, others study the interaction between democracy and
ethnic fractionalization (Svolik, 2008; Easterly and Levine, 1997). An amalgamation of this
research finds that countries with low GDP per capita, high ethnic fractionalization and previous
military dictatorships are more likely to experience backsliding. According to the World Bank
data, as a region the GDP per capita for Sub Saharan Africa was averaged at 1,467 U.S. dollars
in 2015, compared to 57,638 dollars for the United States in the same year (World Bank, 2015).
In a comparison of regions, Sub Saharan Africa ranks last in the averages for GDP per capita
followed by South Asia and the Middle East (World Bank, 2015).
One would assume that these factors alongside the colonial legacy, the historical
prevalence of military dictatorships and military-led coups in Africa, would predispose Africa to
be more prone to backsliding in general. Alternatively, Lührmann et al, (2018), find that Africa
is less prone to reversals, a puzzling and unexpected finding. This leads to an important question:
withstanding current conditions, is Sub Saharan Africa experiencing similar levels of backsliding
in comparison to other regions? While previous studies specify explicit causal variables that
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presumably explain the phenomenon of backsliding, these variables may not hold up in the
African context. Is Sub Saharan Africa seeing different backsliding results than the rest of the
world? If so, why is this happening?
The following study uses a multiple regression analysis to examine the dependent
variable, democratic backsliding, as it relates to several independent variables. In order to better
understand this puzzle, I examine the theoretical arguments posed by previous scholars and pose
additional hypotheses about backsliding in the context of Sub Saharan Africa. My independent
variables of interest are ethnic fractionalization, economic conditions, and previous regime type.
The study examines the causal direction studied by previous scholars- such that low GDP per
capita, high ethnic fractionalization and previous military dictatorships are more likely to
experience backsliding, in the African context. The population of interest is states in Sub Saharan
Africa, from independence (around 1960) to the present. In order to effectively examine the
relationship between the variables in Africa, first we must understand what variables scholars
have found important in the study of backsliding.
First, I examine the previous scholarship on backsliding in order to understand how the
relationships can be understood in Sub Saharan Africa. The subsequent section examines the
theoretical arguments presented throughout the literature review and introduces the hypotheses.
Finally, the various datasets and variables are introduced in the research design and the method
for testing the hypotheses is discussed.
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CHAPTER TWO: EXPLAINING DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING
The classic Modernization Theory, influenced by Max Weber, finds that an increase in
GDP per capita is associated with democratization, and that wealthier states are more likely to
democratize (Bernstein, 2007). A study by Przeworksi et al (2000) finds that GDP per capita is
not a causal factor of democratization, and that with all variables considered that democratic
transitions are not negatively associated with wealth. More so, they argue that there is a
relationship between democratic consolidation and GDP being that countries with a high GDP
are less likely to revert (Przeworksi at al., 2000; Epstein et al, 2006). Epstein and colleagues
disagree, and find that by distinguishing between autocracies, democracies and partial
democracies, that a higher GDP per capita does increase the likelihood of democratization- a
conclusion tantamount to that of Modernization Theory (Epstein et al, 2006). Similarly, in a
study of democratic survival, Milan Svolik (2008), finds that in a study of transitional
democracies economic development is positively associated with democratic survival. He finds
that a one percent increase in economic growth is associated with an eight-month increase in the
survival of a transitional democracy (Svolik, 2008). Miller (2012) similarly finds that economic
development fosters democratization in autocracies that have experienced a violent regime
change in the recent past.
Similarly, a study of democracy duration by Alemán and Yang (2011) argues that
socioeconomic development is the leading factor associated with consolidation, and that low
income is the ultimate threat to reversal. While the relationship between democratic
consolidation and economic conditions is certainly telling, more important to this study, authors
have also examined the association between GDP and backsliding. There is an unanimity among
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scholars that finds that level of income, as indicated by GDP per capita, is negatively associated
with democratic backsliding. In other words, countries with low levels of income are more likely
to experience backsliding, whereas high levels of income are more closely associated with
democratic consolidation (Alemán and Yang, 2011). Therefore, one would anticipate that the
rate of backsliding would be higher in Sub Saharan Africa, given that on average the region has a
lower GDP per capita.
The relationship between democratic duration and economic development is well
documented, as scholars re-emphasize the interaction between level of development and
consolidation (Przeworski et al, 1996). The theoretical argument behind these models of
economic instability find that economic growth fosters economic equality, decentralizes power,
and establishes political awareness (Dahl, 1971; Alemán and Yang, 2011). With that being said,
there is a clear difference between levels of wealth and changes in wealth. The theories presented
generally focus on the level of wealth-such that poorer countries are more likely to experience
backsliding. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this paper, I will also examine the changes in
wealth, such as that caused by an economic crisis, or a civil war.
One of the original scholars of Modernization Theory, Martin Lipset, finds that increased
wealth is associated with democracy because it changes the working conditions of the people and
ultimately re-structures the political functions and responsibilities of the middle class (Lipset,
1959). These theories among others aim to understand why levels of GDP are associated with
democracy-a supposedly consistent trend in the global context.
With that being said, there are others who do not find a significant relationship between
economic development and indicators of backsliding. Gibler and Randazzo (2011) capture a
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variable called economic crisis, which examines when an economic crisis leads to violence or
conflict, which they record as a three percent change in GDP. While this measure is slightly
different to a model that captures GDP per capita, their intention is to understand whether an
economic crisis leads to more conflict, for which conflict can consequently lead to backsliding.
The variable is not significant in their model meaning that they did not find a relationship
between economic crisis and backsliding (Gibler and Randazzo, 2011). Their measure of conflict
as a representation of backsliding is somewhat misleading and the lack of significance may be
attributed to their coding decisions.
Conclusively, therefore, there exists an abundance of literature on the level of economic
development and its effect on democracy. While these studies generally find that low GDP is
associated with backsliding, this assumption does not seem to translate in the African context. If
low GDP is associated with an increased likelihood of backsliding and if Sub Saharan Africa as a
region has the lowest average GDP per capita, why are we not seeing more backsliding in the
African continent? Thus, this paper tries to understand whether GDP per capita behaves
differently in Sub-Saharan, among other predictors of democratic backsliding; such as ethnic
diversity.
Additionally, scholars have cited ethnic fractionalization as a causal factor for
backsliding, ultimately arguing that more ethnic diversity is associated with an increased
likelihood of backsliding. Being that many of the countries in Sub Saharan Africa are highly
diverse, the literature on democratic backsliding and ethnic diversity is extremely relevant.
Easterly and Levine (1997), examine the relationship between economic growth and
ethnic fractionalization in Africa. Their findings indicate that ethnic fractionalization can explain
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the differences in growth rates in Sub Saharan Africa. The authors conclude that diversity in
Africa has led to poor economic growth- which consequently creates political instability, poor
political and economic infrastructure (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Scholars such as Robert Dahl
(1971) and Donald Horowitz (1971), find that ethnic diversity inhibits democratization and that
democratic consolidation has been more successful in monoethnic societies in comparison to
multiethnic ones. In a study of Eastern Europe, Horowitz observed that democratization was
more successful in the countries without ethnic diversity such as Hungary and Poland and less
successful in those with more ethnic diversity such as Bulgaria and Slovakia (Horowitz, 1971).
These studies, which argue that ethnic diversity creates conditions that are not conducive
to democratic consolidation, often theorize that increased diversity leads to conflict, which inturn leads to democratic backsliding (Horowitz, 1985; Mousseau, 2001; Novta, 2016). In a
comparison of ethnically diverse and ethnically homogenous states, Mousseau (2001) finds that
ethnically diverse societies are more prone to political violence. Nevertheless, she concludes that
economic development and democratization are conditions that improve political violence
(Mousseau, 2001). There is a clear distinction though between the early literature on ethnic
diversity and democracy, and current studies. Recently, authors have more carefully examined
the definition of ethnicity, to find that diversity in itself does not cause democratic backsliding,
but rather that certain aspects of ethnic fractionalization lead to conflict (Alesina, 2002; Houle,
2018).
Easterly and Levine’s (1997) measure of ethnic fractionalization captures the
ethnolinguistic differences between ethnic groups and specifically focuses on linguistic diversity.
Alesina (2003) separates linguistic, ethnic and religious fractionalization, in order to capture a
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more inclusive measure of ethnic fractionalization. The Ethnic Power Relations dataset examines
what they call ‘politically relevant ethnic groups’ and improves upon previous attempts to
capture power relations of ethnic groups (Wucherpfenning et al, 2011). Posner (2004), critiques
Easterly and Levine’s (1997) measure of ethnic fractionalization, called ELF [ethno-linguistic
fractionalization] and instead offers a measure called PREG, or Politically Relevant Ethnic
Groups. In his evaluation of 42 African countries, Posner compares the two measures of ethnic
diversity, and finds that the PREG measure is a more accurate representation of ethnic
fractionalization (Posner, 2004). In an evaluation of ethnic voting, Houle (2018), argues that
ethnic diversity only impacts democratic breakdown when ethnic fractionalization is used as a
tool by politicians for political mobilization. He concludes, therefore, that the presence of ethnic
diversity itself does not lead to backsliding, but rather that when a country experiences high
levels of ‘ethnic voting’, they are more likely to see democratic backsliding (Houle, 2018).
With that being said, Fish and Brooks (2004), review the scholarship on ethnic
fractionalization, conflict, and democracy and argue that the findings are inconsistent. While
there seems to be a relationship between ethnicity and democratic survival, scholars cannot seem
to agree on the exact parameters of that relationship. Part of this inconsistency can be attributed
to the absence of a clear definitive definition of ethnicity. While some authors define ethnicity in
linguistic terms, others focus on the importance of ethnic power in politics. How does ethnic
diversity impact democratization and backsliding in Sub Saharan Africa, and is this impact
different to that theorized in previous literature?
Each of the authors use a distinct and different measure of ethnic diversity, each
capturing a different aspect of the variable. While there is a benefit to studying these discrete
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nuanced differences in the variable, it is also important to capture diversity in its entirety. What
these studies fail to capture is an overall measure of diversity, which is a gap that this paper aims
to fill.
The third independent variable, previous regime type, is also an important measure that
authors have used to explain democratic backsliding. This theoretical argument dates back to
Juan Linz’s (1994) classic finding that parliamentary systems are more likely to support
democracy in comparison to presidential systems. He argues that presidential systems have a
winner-takes-all structure that inhibits democratization stabilization (Linz, 1994). Subsequently,
in 1996, Alvarez and colleagues (1996) created a classification for 141 countries as either
democracies or dictatorships, to establish a more systematic way to classify regimes. These
studies opened an avenue for research for understanding the relationship between presidential
systems and democratic consolidation. While several authors posited theoretical pathways for
this relationship, Cheibub et al (2004), suggested that the struggle to form government coalitions
ultimately impacted democratization efforts. Consequently, this argument was proven wrong in
their analysis, and they concluded that both forms of government are vulnerable to the
difficulties of coalition formation (Cheibub et al, 2004). The puzzle of presidentialism remained,
for which Cheibub (2007) offered an alternative explanation: the legacy of military dictatorship.
He finds instability among regimes with a previous military regime, as opposed to one of civilian
leadership, which he attributes to this instability among presidential regimes- or a tendency
towards backsliding (Cheibub, 2007).
Building on the work of Cheibub, Milan Svolik (2008) finds that alongside economic
determinants, a countries’ previous regime type impacts the likelihood of backsliding. He finds
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that previous scholarship including the work of Przeworksi et al (2000), fails to distinguish
between consolidated democracies, and transitional democracies. This distinction is important
for understanding the age of a democracy, and the likelihood of reverting. Contiguous with
Linz’s findings, Svolik’s model finds that previous military dictatorships are less likely to
consolidate in comparison to civilian regimes (Svolik, 2008). In a notable study of 280 autocratic
regimes, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) examine regime transitions, how leaders leave
power, and the regime time prior to and following the transition. They re-examine the previous
regime-type classifications and expand upon the different types of rule and find that personalist
dictatorships are much less likely to democratize compared to dominant-party regimes (Geddes,
Wright and Frantz, 2014). This leads to the question of whether certain types of autocracies are
more likely to experience backsliding. If personalist dictatorships are less likely to democratize,
are they more likely to experience backsliding? While the list of explanations for why
democracies fail is extensive, the methods for which to examine democratic failure are also
extensive.
What makes certain autocratic regime legacies less accustomed to consolidation than
other regime types? Cheibub (2007) finds that it is the legacy of military influence in politics that
‘kills’ democracy, rather than simply being an autocratic regime. Similarly, Svolik (2008) finds
that having both a military legacy and a presidential executive increases the ‘susceptibility’ to
reversals. The author argues that the military past of a country does not have a direct effect on
democratic backsliding, but rather it increases the likelihood of backsliding during an economic
recession. Additionally, the legacy of a monarchy in a democracy actually reduces the likelihood
of reversal (Svolik, 2008).

10

Is Linz’s (1994) assumption correct, are presidential systems less likely to experience
democratic survival in comparison to parliamentary systems? Adserà and Boix (2006) find that
in the developing world, presidential systems are less secure and stable. They argue that a
president, as compared to a prime minister, is less constrained by the legislative, allowing for
corrupt behavior in less wealthy countries. The authors argue that this somewhat unconstrained
power leads to two scenarios of democratic breakdown, either the president abuses their power
and democratic institutions are weakened, or a third-party source intervenes such as the
legislature or the military.
While Linz (1994) and Adserà and Boix (2006) find that presidential regimes are less
likely to democratize, why specifically are former military dictatorships more likely to revert?
Bjørnskov (2017) examines the democratization of autocratic regimes, and he finds that military
dictatorships generally become presidential democracies. He argues that this occurs because
shifts towards democracy in military dictatorships are generally premeditated, whereas those in
civilian leadership are unexpected or unanticipated (Bjørnskov, 2017). Alternatively, Alexandre
Debs (2016) argues that because of the legacy of violence often associated with military dictators
the leader continues to be a threat to the successor. The author finds that military dictatorships
democratize rapidly, as democratization provides protection to the leader against violent bids at
usurping their power (Debs, 2016). Being that Sub Saharan Africa has an extensive history of
military dictatorships, one would expect that backsliding would be extremely prevalent in the
region. In the African context, are military dictatorships more likely to experience backsliding, or
is this trend not as apparent in Sub Saharan Africa?
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Although the research on backsliding is far from scarce, the uniformity of the research is
disconcerting, as authors use exceptionally different markers for what they define as democratic
failure. A majority of the scholars use Dahl’s (1979) conceptualization of democracy to some
extent, but the different thresholds and markers for democracy are instrumental in understanding
how the independent variables impact democratic backsliding. While some authors capture
backsliding using the Polity IV data to capture the nuanced differences in backsliding, a majority
of the authors examined in this literature review code a country as either democratic or
autocratic. Gibler and Randazzo (2011) examine the difference in overall regime score, as
measured by Polity IV, and consider a country to be a democracy within a range of 3 to 6 on the
-10 to +10 Polity range. As they intend to measure large differences in regime change, they code
backsliding as a negative change in four or more points on the Polity scale (Gibler and
Randazzo, 2011). A study by Epstein et al (2006), codes countries as either autocracies,
democracies or anocracies, using the traditional Polity IV scale. Similarly, Kapstein and
Converse (2008) use Polity IV and economic data in order to capture democratic backsliding in
88 countries between 1960 to 2004. In their analysis of regime breakdown, Alemán and Yang
(2011) also use the Polity IV measure to examine backsliding, and defined regime transition by a
3-point difference in either direction. While the Polity IV measure can be a useful tool for
understanding global trends of democracy for the purpose of understanding backsliding,
categorically distinct classifications are more useful. Rather than looking at nuanced differences
in democracy in Africa, we are interested in large-scale differences from democracy to
autocracy.
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A study by Gleditsch and Ward (1997) finds that there a several pathways to the same
polity score, and that the executive constraints aspect of democracy is the most important
indicator, followed by competitiveness. There are potentially important implications for how
both democracy and democratic backsliding are defined through coding decisions, therefore it is
important that an author understands what aspects of democracy they are capturing in order to
understand what is causing a country to experience backsliding. Nancy Bermeo (2016) discusses
the issues with the study of democratic backsliding and finds one of the biggest challenges is the
large breadth of concepts that can qualify as ‘backsliding’. While in its most basic form,
backsliding refers to the breakdown of democratic institutions, the oversimplification of this
concept leads to an important inconsistency in the literature on backsliding. First, in referring to
democratic breakdown, are we simply referring to the breakdown of electoral quality, such as
extending term limits and corrupt election practices? Does this definition include other forms of
democratic breakdown such as the reduction of social rights and human rights?
The question of how this should be measured is an important aspect of studying
democracy- and the answer depends on how the author defines backsliding, and what aspects of
democracy the author hopes to capture. For the purpose of this study, the dataset by Geddes,
Wright and Frantz (2014) defines democracy by the presence of competitive elections and major
policy changes, and therefore focuses on the political structure of the state. This measure does
not capture smaller changes in social democratic rights, it instead focuses on larger political
changes. The inconsistency in measuring democratic backsliding across studies leads to the
necessity of this research project.
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CHAPTER THREE: HYPOTHESES
Democracy is a very comprehensive term, therefore defining democracy and its
conceptual relevance to backsliding is central to understanding why democracies fail. In its
origin, democracy can be divided between three classic categories: the idea of direct democracy
for which Jean Jacques Rousseau spearheaded, the accountability of leaders by John Locke and
competition amongst leaders by Robert Dahl (Harvard University). Scholars studying
backsliding have generally used Dahl’s concept of polyarchal democracy because of its
inclusivity. For the purpose of this paper we will adopt the following definition of democratic
backsliding “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that
sustain an existing democracy” (Bermeo, 2016). In short, democratic backsliding refers to the
transition from a democracy to an authoritarian regime, and this excludes democracies that still
qualify as democracies that are becoming less free.
The relevance and necessity of this paper is in the consistency that it provides for the
measure of democracy across the different explanations for backsliding. The study re-evaluates
existing causal pathways and therefore, the theoretical approaches employed are consistent with
those used by previous scholars. With that being said, rather than just re-testing existing theories,
this project examines three prevalent explanations for the same phenomenon, using consistent
measures across the data. More so, the results will enable us to better understand the puzzle of
whether these trends are consistent within the African context.
When comparing global levels of diversity, Fisher (2013) finds that Sub Saharan Africa is
by far the most ethnically diverse region, with the top twenty most diverse states all being in
Africa. The findings introduced by Lührmann and colleagues (2018) discovers that, as a region,
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Sub Saharan Africa is experiencing less backsliding as compared to other regions. This study
focuses solely on Sub Saharan Africa, in order to understand whether or not the continent is
experiencing different levels of democratic backsliding, given the elements previously discussed.
While the relevance to Africa is clearly delineated in the puzzle presented by Lührmann et al
(2018), this limited focus to Africa has inevitable consequences. While previous scholars have
generally analyzed the data in a global sample, the main focus of this study is on Sub Saharan
African, which presents certain issues with external validity. While the findings may provide
insight to democratic backsliding in Africa, this information cannot be generalized to other poor,
ethnically diverse military regimes. While the scope of this study is limited to Africa, this opens
an avenue for future research on how these patterns transfer to other ethnically diverse, poorer
regions.
As the following study is predicated on the assumption that comparatively Africa is
experiencing less backsliding, I will employ a dummy variable in order to test the following
hypothesis:
H1 Is Sub Saharan Africa experiencing different levels of democratic backsliding in
comparison to other regions.
Next, I introduce the three independent variables to the measure of backsliding, in order to
understand whether or not the variables are significant across a constant measure of democracy. I
will test the following hypotheses using the same measure as my dependent variable:
H2: Countries with a low GDP per capita are more likely to experience democratic
backsliding than those with a higher average GDP per capita.
H3: Highly diverse countries are more likely to experience democratic backsliding in
comparison to those with less diversity.
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H4: Presidential systems are more likely to experience backsliding, in comparison to
parliamentary systems.
H5: Previous Military dictatorships are more likely to experience backsliding, in
comparison to civilian leadership.
As these hypotheses elucidate, the following analysis examines these trends in Sub Saharan
Africa, in order to understand whether the hypotheses are consistent in Africa, or if the data
behaves differently. Should we expect these patterns to remain significant in the African context,
or do these patterns behave differently in Sub Saharan Africa? Nevertheless, before answering
this question the details of the research design must be carefully analyzed.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN
As discussed previously, the first independent variable of interest is economic stability, as
captured by GDP per capita. The theories argue that poorer countries are less likely to become
consolidated democracies, and more likely to revert. The GDP per capita variable measures the
value of the goods and services produced in a given country, divided by the population (United
Nations, 2007). The GDP per capita marker shows the overall welfare of citizens in a state and is
a straightforward indicator of the success or failure of a given economy. While other variables
such as Gross National Income (GNI) and the Human and the Development Index (HDI)
incorporate variables that assess economic stability, they also measure indicators that are
unnecessary for this study such as education, life expectancy and income (United Nations
Development Programme, 2016). The GDP per capita indicator is a standard measure, and as we
are re-evaluating previous work, we will use this measure, as it is consistent throughout the
scholarship. While measures of GDP per capita are generally standard across datasets, I use the
World Bank measure because of its comprehensive capture of GDP across the globe.
The second independent variable, ethnic fractionalization is more complex-as there are
several different methods used by scholars to capture ethnic diversity. Whereas some authors
look at the number of ethnic groups in a country, others have looked at the political relevance of
ethnic groups (Posner, 2004). In order to accurately represent the work on ethnic
fractionalization and democratic backsliding, I will use several measures to capture the variable.
The following table presents the different measures of ethnic fractionalization examined in this
paper.
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Table 1: Measures of Ethnic Fractionalization

MEASURE OF ETHNIC

ELF (1997)

FRACTIONALIZATION

PREG

EPR (2018)

(2004)

ALESINA ROEDER
ET AL.

BAH (1989)

(2001)

(2003)
SAMPLE

MEASURE

129 countries

Ethno-linguistic
fractionalization

42 African
countries

Politically
relevant
ethnic
groups

Global sample of
over 800 ethnic
groups

215

185 cases from

41 African

countries

1961 and 1985

Countries

Politically
relevant ethnic
groups measured
by the power of
the
representatives

Ethnolinguistic
and religious
diversity

A measure of
multiple aspects of
ethnic diversity
combined into one
distinct measure
-Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization

Ethnolinguistic
Fractionalization
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The first measure is Posner’s PREG dataset (Politically Relevant Ethnic Group), which
analyzes 42 African countries and the dynamic between ethnic groups, competition over
resources and competition among ethnic groups. Using the ethnic classifications in Atlas, the
author examined each individual case, in order to create the PREG measure. With that being
said, the PREG measure does not account for the “concentration of the ethnic groups, or the
divisions among them”, a shortcoming the author acknowledges (Posner, 2004). While there are
several alternative measures to PREG, including the ELF data, these measures do not account for
the political relevance of such groups, and instead examine the ethno-linguistic differences
within a country. Posner (2004) proposes that this distinction is instrumental to understanding the
process of backsliding. There are clear advantages to both approaches therefore, for the purpose
of this paper we will include several measures for both politically relevant groups and for ethnolinguistic differences. Morrison and colleagues (1992), introduced what is called the Black
Africa Handbook, henceforth BAH, which examines political, social and economic factors of 32
black African countries. Both the data from the BAH (1992) and Roeder (2001) is taken from
Posner’s data on ethnic fractionalization, and they provide two additional measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
While Posner’s in-depth analysis of each African case provides a deeper understanding of
ethnic diversity and power relations in the 42 African countries, this also limits the study.
Therefore, I also use the Ethnic Power Relations dataset from 1946 to 2018, which includes data
on over eight hundred ethnic groups (Vogt et al, 2015). The EPR Core dataset examines
politically relevant ethnic groups and determines the level of state power that the representatives
of an ethnic group have access to (Vogt et al, 2015). I also incorporate the Fractionalization
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dataset created by Alesina and colleagues (2003), in order to account for the second theoretical
argument. Does overall diversity impact the likelihood of backsliding, regardless of political
power dynamics? This data examines the linguistic and religious aspects of ethnicity, to create a
comprehensive measure of fractionalization for 215 countries (Alesina et al, 2003). The
combination of these measures of ethnic fractionalization provides a varied and inclusive
representation of the scholarship examined, and while there are both shortcomings and
advantages to all of these datasets, they are the most appropriate measures for this study. While
both the PREG and EPR datasets are advantageous in their use of political relevance, the data by
Alesina et al (2003) fills the gap of simple diversity that the first two do not account for.
The third independent variable, previous regime type, is accounted for by the data
provided in the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) dataset, the Autocratic Regimes Dataset.
While the study mainly examines autocratic regime breakdowns, (which captures the dependent
variable) the authors include a variable for regime type. They code each case as either a
dominant-party, military, personalist, monarchic, oligarchic, indirect-military, or a hybrid. These
coding decisions are made based on the following definition of regime type: “basic informal and
formal rules that determine what interests are represented in the authoritarian leadership group
and whether these interests can restrain the dictator” (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). In other
words, the authors look at who controls party policies and important domestic and international
policy decisions, and then decide which of the seven categories an autocratic regime should
reside. Within the umbrella of autocratic rule there is variation in the degree of democratic
structure and repressiveness, therefore, this distinction is very important. While authors of
datasets such as that by Cheibub et al (2007) and Svolik (2008) provide very similar
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categorizations of regime type- the primary goal of this study is to offer consistency within the
measure. As the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) dataset is used for the dependent variable, the
logical progression was to use their regime classification.
Finally, I use the Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) data to account for the dependent
variable: democratic backsliding. The Autocratic Regimes Dataset observes regime breakdown
in autocracies from 1946 to 2010 and captures both transitions from an autocracy to a new
autocracy, and the transition from an autocracy to a democracy (Geddes, Wright and Frantz,
2014). Similar to their classification of regime-types, they code transitions based on the informal
and formal rules made by leaders, and the decisions and characteristics of the ruling regime.
Unlike the data provided by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) [CGV], which revises and
updates the data in Przeworski et al. (2000), the Autocratic Regimes data includes coding for
provisional governments and for periods of failed rule or anarchy. While previously coded under
autocratic regimes, the dataset distinguishes between autocratic, democratic, not independent,
occupation, provisional government and having no central government (Geddes, Wright and
Frantz, 2014). Rather than comparing yearly, the authors identify the regime start date, and the
end date, in order to understand transitions better-and include the method in which a regime ends
(coup, civil war etc.) and the level of violence. Although their dataset is quite similar to that of
CGV (2010), the differentiations made amongst autocratic regimes are important for this study.
The authors include variables that capture suffrage and party competition in determining when
autocratic regimes start and end, which are not included in CGV (2010), but are central to
understanding backsliding (Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014).
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There are inevitable shortcomings associated with each chosen dataset given that a
definition of democracy, regime-type and authoritarianism are far from comprehensive. While
the Geddes et al (2014) data may focus on undemocratic means of consolidating power and
change of formal and informal rules, it does not account for other aspects of democratic
backsliding such as loss of formal institutions and human rights. There are alternatives to the
Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) data, but ultimately, I decided that the Autocratic Regimes
dataset is the best fit for this study. The definitions provided, the coding decisions and the
extensiveness of their available observations, fit well with my independent variables.
In order to account for a spurious relationship in the data I control for the following
variables: economic growth, civil conflict, regime duration and civil conflict. The first control
variable relates to the first independent variable or a countries level of wealth, being that changes
in growth rates could impact backsliding, in addition to GDP per capita. Changes in growth rates
accounts for instances of economic crises, following the theoretical argument that the likelihood
of backsliding increases after an economic crisis (United Nations, 2007). Subsequently, rather
than ethnic fractionalization it could be that civil conflict, or ethnic conflict may be related to the
dependent variable. Lastly, scholars have argued that democracy duration impacts the likelihood
of democratization, being that the longer the regime has been a democracy, the more likely they
are to consolidate; therefore, we must control for regime duration (Carbone and Memoli, 2013).
We should expect that newer democracies are more likely to experience backsliding, in
comparison to older democracies. This is measured in regime years, such that older democracies
(+3 years) are less likely to revert in comparison to newer democracies (-3 years). The measure
of civil conflict is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which examines
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armed conflict with a minimum of 25 battle related deaths (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2013). I
also examine the relationship between backsliding and presidential vs parliamentary systems,
which is taken from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) which differentiates between
parliamentary systems and presidential systems (Cruz et al, 2015).
As the dependent variable (backsliding) is a dichotomous variable, meaning a state is
either a democracy or an autocracy, a logistic regression is the most appropriate measure to
analyze the variables. The sample examined will exclude autocracies, as the study aims to
measure democratic backsliding in African democracies. The study measures whether or not a
democracy reverts to authoritarianism in the subsequent year, if so the country is excluded from
the following year. In using logistic regression, as compared to other methods, one can assess the
strength of the independent variable on the dependent variable, after adjusting for the control
variables, which removes confounding effects (Pollock, 2016). The following section illustrates
the findings and analyzes the results.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DATA AND ANALYSIS
In order to understand the impact of democratic backsliding in Sub-Saharan Africa, first
we must determine whether or not there is a significant regional difference in the prevalence of
democratic failure. As a region has Sub-Saharan Africa been less susceptible to the decline in
democracy that other regions such as the Americas and Europe have experienced, as Luhrmann
and colleagues suggest? The conclusions presented by Luhrmann et al (2018) seems to go
against what we would intuitively expect based on the literature previously reviewed. Therefore,
the first hypothesis asks if there is a regional difference in backsliding and if the levels of
backsliding are different in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions. Using Sub-Saharan
Africa as the exclusion group, the following table measures democratic backsliding on a regional
basis.
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Table 2: Democratic Backsliding A Global Comparison

Americas
Europe
MENA
Asia & Oceana
Ethnic Diversity
GDP per Capita
Economic Growth
Civil Conflict
Presidential Regime
Regime Duration
Constant
Observations

Alesina
Eth

Alesina
Lang

Alesina
Rel

EPR Groups

EPR EGIP

-0.366
(0.725)
-0.584
(1.033)
1.129
(0.989)
0.602
(0.666)
1.720
(1.079)
-0.421
(0.275)
-7.539***
(2.012)
0.689
(0.470)
-0.290
(0.545)
-0.048**
(0.022)
-0.854
(2.190)
2,006

0.002
(0.932)
-0.641
(1.043)
1.123
(1.026)
0.413
(0.641)
1.130
(0.968)
-0.543*
(0.312)
-8.986***
(2.357)
0.596
(0.485)
-0.415
(0.545)
-0.052**
(0.022)
0.567
(2.347)
2,000

-0.689
(0.748)
-1.134
(0.977)
0.774
(1.006)
0.368
(0.662)
0.460
(1.109)
-0.428
(0.268)
-7.038***
(2.077)
0.770*
(0.467)
-0.223
(0.502)
-0.055**
(0.023)
0.135
(1.933)
2,024

-0.637
(0.683)
-1.590
(1.051)
0.499
(0.953)
0.050
(0.659)
0.086**
(0.038)
-0.351
(0.269)
-6.902***
(2.060)
0.498
(0.484)
-0.363
(0.537)
-0.058***
(0.021)
-0.367
(1.983)
1,877

-1.046
(0.711)
-1.392
(1.018)
0.505
(0.988)
0.197
(0.631)
-0.096
(0.106)
-0.422
(0.280)
-7.114***
(2.064)
0.650
(0.473)
-0.245
(0.507)
-0.044*
(0.023)
0.590
(2.005)
1,877

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Being that Sub-Saharan Africa is the exclusion group in the model, each region is being
compared to Africa across every measure of ethnic fractionalization. The measures are all
insignificant, which means that for each distinct region there is no significant difference in
democratic failure between the region and Sub-Saharan Africa. In other words, for these specific
models we did not find a regional difference in backsliding such as the one indicated by
Luhrmann and colleagues (2018). The first hypothesis is not supported by the data, therefore the
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idea that Sub-Saharan Africa is quantitatively different to other regions in the context of
democratic backsliding is not supported.
As there are no samples of prior military regimes in the European cases, this variable was
removed from this specific analysis. With that being said, both economic growth and regime
duration appear to be extremely significant for all of the different measures of ethnic diversity.
Economic growth is negative and significant, meaning that as economic growth increases, the
probability of democratic backsliding decreases, such that economic growth fosters stability.
Similarly, the longer a regime is a democracy the less likely they are to experience backsliding.
The second hypothesis introduces the relationship between GDP per capita and
backsliding, which is represented in all of the tables.
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Table 3: Democratic Backsliding and Regime Type

Sub-Saharan Africa
Prior Military
Regime
Ethnic Diversity
GDP per Capita
Economic Growth
Civil Conflict
Presidential Regime
Regime Duration
Constant
Observations

Alesina
Eth

Alesina
Lang

Alesina
Rel

EPR
Groups

EPR
EGIP

0.083
(0.599)
1.251**

-0.191
(0.665)
1.660***

0.465
(0.667)
0.873*

0.447
(0.577)
1.108**

0.323
(0.615)
1.020*

(0.523)
3.503***
(1.235)
-0.743**
(0.327)
-5.222*
(2.719)
1.187**
(0.463)
-1.149**
(0.542)
-0.017
(0.035)
0.354
(2.660)
1,045

(0.626)
3.588***
(1.164)
-0.784**
(0.359)
-6.600**
(3.198)
0.906*
(0.494)
-0.835
(0.516)
0.007
(0.040)
0.467
(2.946)
1,021

(0.492)
0.313
(1.224)
-0.650**
(0.296)
-4.742*
(2.519)
1.362***
(0.462)
-0.610
(0.490)
-0.032
(0.035)
1.206
(2.372)
1,045

(0.514)
0.098*
(0.052)
-0.808**
(0.316)
-3.916
(2.731)
1.108**
(0.478)
-0.742
(0.502)
-0.014
(0.036)
2.036
(2.449)
1,042

(0.542)
0.090
(0.147)
-0.715**
(0.305)
-3.995
(2.678)
1.273***
(0.459)
-0.666
(0.494)
-0.027
(0.035)
1.659
(2.413)
1,042

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

The GDP per capita variable is negative and significant for all of the measures of ethnic
diversity, meaning that as GDP per capita increases the probability of backsliding decreases.
With that being said, in Table 4, the results are mixed, being that in the African sample the
results are significant across some of the measures and not for others. Therefore, while the
results are strong in the overall measure of democratic backsliding, when the analysis is isolated
to Sub Saharan Africa the relationship is less apparent. The data partially supports the idea that
GDP per capita leads to an increased probability of backsliding, but due to the inconsistency in
the results we cannot support the second hypothesis.
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The third hypothesis discusses the relationship between ethnic diversity and democratic
backsliding, and the data partially supports this conclusion. The measure of ethnic diversity is
positive and significant for both the ethnic and linguistic measures of the Alesina variable and
the EPR data. It is important to note that diversity is a comprehensive topic and that each
measure means something different and could potentially have a distinct and different impact. In
the findings there is a consistent trend that finds that the ethno-linguistic measures of
fractionalization appear significant while the politically relevant ethnic groups are mostly
insignificant. This important theoretical distinction could have a profound impact on the study of
ethnic diversity and its role in democratic backsliding. With that, the measure for politically
relevant ethnic groups could only be capturing a partial picture of politically relevant ethnic
groups. A study by Beth Rabinowitz (2018) finds that leaders in Sub Saharan Africa are
increasingly accountable to groups outside of the central leadership and that leaders find
themselves creating relationships with rural leaders. These rural leaders, who often represent
minority or even majority ethnic groups could play an important role in democratic backsliding,
but they would be excluded from the list of ‘politically relevant’ ethnic groups.
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Table 4: African Sample of Ethnic Diversity and Backsliding
Alesina Eth
Prior Military Regime
3.426***
(1.197)
Ethnic Diversity
1.189
(2.806)
GDP per Capita
-1.284
(0.83)
Economic Growth
-11.684**
(5.327)
Civil Conflict
1.064
(0.756)
Presidential Regime
2.749
(2.067)
Regime Duration
-0.015
(0.095)
Constant
1.669
(4.933)
Observations
204
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Alesina Lang
3.501***
(1.198)
2.686
(2.318)
-1.533*
(0.848)
-12.217**
(5.357)
0.994
(0.737)
2.235
(1.949)
-0.008
(0.094)
2.785
(4.928)
204

Alesina Rel
3.457***
(1.201)
2.687
(2.179)
-1.582*
(0.888)
-10.948**
(5.123)
1.251
(0.767)
3.598**
(1.664)
-0.004
(0.096)
2.138
(5.073)
204

EPR Groups
3.642***
(1.341)
-0.013
(0.156)
-1.291
(0.873)
-10.967**
(5.532)
0.805
(0.81)
3.396*
(2.019)
-0.007
(0.098)
1.979
(5.209)
201
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EPR EGIP
3.504***
(1.257)
-0.132
(0.191)
-1.352
(0.899)
-11.656**
(5.699)
0.679
(0.803)
3.512**
(1.676)
-0.015
(0.095)
2.674
(5.432)
201

Bah
3.371***
(1.227)
0.520
(2.704)
-1.276
(0.859)
-12.030**
(5.268)
1.011
(0.744)
2.900
(2.495)
-0.020
(0.095)
2.052
(5.218)
189

Roeder
3.232***
(1.140)
4.913
(4.078)
-1.333*
(0.799)
-12.132**
(5.183)
1.270*
(0.765)
0.677
(2.620)
-0.020
(0.092)
1.090
(4.862)
204

PREG
3.795***
(1.343)
-1.468
(1.795)
-1.402
(0.889)
-12.415**
(5.335)
0.920
(0.743)
3.919**
(1.873)
-0.035
(0.095)
2.786
(5.332)
203

With that being said, when the study is limited to Sub-Saharan Africa- as displayed in table 4
above- the measure is no longer significant for any of the measures of ethnic diversity.
Therefore, the data does not support the third hypothesis, and based on this information
we are unable to decisively conclude that in Sub Saharan Africa ethnic diversity cultivates
political instability, as the results are mixed. With that being said, the measure for ethnic
diversity is positive and significant for one measure in table 2 and for three measures in table 3.
The following figures demonstrate the relationship between ethnic diversity and democratic
backsliding, and the first column represents the data in table 2, while the second column
represents the data from table 3. While the figures display a general trend of an increased
probability of backsliding as diversity increases, it is important to remember that not all of the
figures are significant.
To the left of each individual figure the probability of backsliding is recorded whereas,
the measure for ethnic diversity is on the bottom. The top six graphs in figure 1 record a measure
of ethno-linguistic diversity, whereas the bottom four graphs indicate an increase in the number
of ethnically diverse groups.
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Ethnicity Figures for Table 2

Ethnicity Figures for Table 3
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Figure 1: Ethnic Fractionalization and the Probability of Backsliding
The fourth diagram in column one is significant for the Ethnic Power Relations Data and
it finds that as the number of politically relevant ethnic groups increases, so does the probability
of backsliding. In the second column, the first two Alesina measures are significant, meaning as
the sample becomes more ethnically diverse, the likelihood of backsliding increases.
Additionally, the fourth diagram in column two is significant for the politically relevant ethnic
groups.
When the study is limited to Sub Saharan Africa the significant relationship between
ethnic fractionalization and democratic backsliding is not apparent. The diagrams in Figure 2 are
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based on the data in Table 4, and they show an overall trend that as diversity increases,
backsliding becomes more prevalent; with that being said the measures are not significant.
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Figure 2: Ethnicity Figures for Africa
Overall the data points to a relationship between ethnic diversity and democratic
backsliding, but in order to arrive at a more definitive conclusion a more in-depth analysis would
need to take place.
The fourth hypothesis compares presidential systems to parliamentary systems and asks if
presidential systems are more likely to experience backsliding. The variable is not significant in
table 2, and it is negative and significant for one model in table 3. Unlike the predicted
hypothesis this finding means that presidential systems are less likely to see backsliding, with
that being said the variable is not significant for most models. Alternatively, in table 4 the
measure is positive and significant for four of the eight models, as expected in the predicted
hypothesis. Therefore, the data suggests that in Sub-Saharan Africa presidential systems are
more likely to experience democratic backsliding. We can cautiously conclude that the data
supports the fourth hypothesis. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a challenge in the data on
Presidential vs Parliamentary systems is in the large absence of Parliamentary systems in the
sample of Sub-Saharan African countries. There are very few examples of Parliamentary systems
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in the study, and those that do show up were replaced quickly. While there may be a significant
relationship between the variables, it may be that it just is not showing up in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The fifth and final hypothesis finds that if the prior regime was a military dictatorship
they are more likely to experience backsliding. This hypothesis is strongly supported by the data,
and the measure is positive and significant for all of the models in both table 3 and table 4. The
third table is comparing Africa to the rest of the world and finds that if a prior regime was a
military dictatorship they are more likely to experience backsliding.
The control variable of the occurrence of civil conflict is positive and significant in Table
3, meaning that as a civil conflict increases, the likelihood of backsliding increases. Interestingly,
this trend is not significant in the African sample in Table 4. Additionally, while the measure for
regime duration is significant in Table 2, this trend is no longer significant in Table’s 3 and 4.
Economic growth is negative and significant, meaning that as economic growth increases, the
likelihood of backsliding decreases. This measure is negative and significant in all of the tables
and is especially strong in the sample limited to Sub-Saharan Africa. The following diagrams in
Figure 3 show the relationship between economic growth and backsliding.
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Figure 3: Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa
The figure on the top left is based on the data in Table 2, and it shows that as economic
growth increases the probability of backsliding decreases. The diagram on the top right is of a
sample of countries who have had a regime type change, and it is based on the data from Table 3.
The figure on the bottom right is showing the relationship between growth rates and backsliding
when Sub-Saharan Africa is removed from the sample. The graph indicates that without Africa
in the sample the relationship between economic growth and backsliding disappears. Ultimately
Africa is driving the trend between growth rates and backsliding, which is important for the
context of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
The notorious ‘wave of democracy’ in the 1990’s stimulated intense debate among
scholars about the extent of democratization and the future of democracy (Huntington 1998;
Klingemann 1999). As the expanse of democracy continues to not only slow but rather reverse,
the discussion of potential explanations for this trend is increasingly vital and necessary (Lipset,
1993). The study of democratic backsliding has similarly roused important questions: is there a
global trend of a reversion to authoritarianism and away from democracy? This paper sought to
understand democratic backsliding in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa and consequently
revealed unexpected trends and discoveries. Firstly, a regional analysis found that there is not a
significant difference between the different regions of the world in terms of democratic
backsliding.
In surmising the research on the decline of democracy and the potential catalysts for
democratic backsliding, it became clear that while the literature is extensive it lacks consistency
and uniformity. Each paper examines democratic backsliding through a different lens, each with
different parameters for what the phenomenon entails. The first objective in the research process
was figuring out a middle ground for which to base the project in order to create a paper that can
objectively compared to the existing research. The Geddes Wright and Frantz measure of
democratic failure accomplished this middle ground, and I included several different measures of
ethnic fractionalization and regime type indicators. After determining that there is not a regional
difference in backsliding, I introduced a second measure that included prior regime type data.
After analyzing the data, we were able to reject the first hypothesis, support the fourth and fifth
hypotheses, and the data was inconclusive for both the second and third hypotheses.
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While ethnic fractionalization measure is positive and significant in both table two and
three, the relationship disappears when the study is limited to Sub-Saharan Africa. With that
being said, ethnic diversity- and specifically politically relevant ethnic groups- seem to play an
integral role in democratic backsliding, and this study could be inadvertently overlooking its
impact in Africa. A more comprehensive and in-depth study of ethnic diversity and its impact in
Africa could provide additional insight into what factors drive backsliding.
An aspect that is missing from this study, but advantageous nonetheless, are case studies
looking into specific aspects of democratic backsliding and their root causes. For the purpose of
time I was unable to provide a thorough investigation of case studies in Sub-Saharan Africa- but
the importance of such a study should not be underemphasized for future endeavors.
As with every paper, there are shortcomings that potentially impacted the results, validity
and replication of this study. As a student with moderate expertise on the subject of democratic
backsliding, I am limited in my ability to completely and wholly grasp every aspect of what
democratic backsliding entails. More so, while the study revealed interesting and telling aspects
of democratic backsliding in both Sub-Saharan Africa and in the global sample- these results are
limited in scope. While these results are specific to Sub-Saharan Africa, a comparative study
between other regions with low GDP per capita, high ethnic diversity and a history of military
regimes- such as South America- would enhance and develop the study. Additionally, the study
relied on data and findings from other authors, and therefore the definitions and parameters were
limited to the expanse of such studies.
The biggest takeaway from the data was the impact of economic growth, especially in the
case of Sub-Saharan Africa- as it seems to be the driving force behind the trend. After removing
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Sub Saharan Africa from the analysis, the impact of economic growth disappeared. Why does
economic growth have a strong negative and significant impact in Sub-Saharan Africa, and why
does this disappear in other regions? As economies become stronger they seem to become more
resilient to the occurrence of democratic backsliding, and this important finding can enable
policymakers and politicians to potentially curb the extent of backsliding in the future.
Alongside economic growth GDP per capita, regime duration, previous military regime
type and ethnic diversity all play an important role in the story of backsliding. In order to avoid
democratic recession and this seemingly global move towards autocratization, our focus should
revolve around economic stability and measures that promote economic growth. The wave of
democracy so eminently foretold by Huntington (1999), may have stalled and reversed but the
story not yet complete. As the relatively young countries of Sub-Saharan Africa continue to grow
and develop and foster economic growth, democratization will likely follow. The next ‘wave of
democracy’ will potentially develop in Africa as policymakers overcome existing obstacles and
begin to focus on initiatives that encourage economic stability.
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